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ABSTRACT: The main focus of our paper is on a specific form of democratic discourse, used in different 
types of social engagement actions (petitions, speeches, intellectual engagement, ad hoc citizens’ protests, 
social movements etc.), that attempts to politicize a certain issue by challenging the neoliberal principle of 
instrumentalism which argues that democratic procedures can legitimately be abandoned in the name of 
the greater efficiency of socio-economic development. Therefore, we start from identifying the discourse 
of “neoliberal instrumentalism” and its relative success in delegitimizing the welfare state and mechanisms 
of democratic decision making and we formulate a conceptual model of a democratic counter-narrative 
named “anti-instrumentalist discourse”. Through empirical analyses of discourse used by We Won't Let 
Belgrade D(r)own initiative, that mobilized against the Serbian government's urban project Belgrade Wa-
terfront we try to illustrate the applicability and the heuristic value of the proposed model.  The data for 
the analyses were collected through 1) desk analysis of available secondary data on the Belgrade Water-




front project, 2) official statements and proclamations of the We Won't Let Belgrade D(r)own initiative, 3) 
semi-structured interviews with four core members of the initiative.  
 
KEYWORDS: Anti-instrumentalist discourse, deliberative democracy, neoliberal instrumentalism, social 
engagement, We Won’t let Belgrade D(r)own initiative.  
 




Our intention in this paper is twofold. First, we wish to offer a conceptual model of a 
specific type of discourse that we define as ‘anti-instrumentalist’, and that, we argue, 
has the potential to challenge the discursive strategy of neoliberalism that we term 
“instrumentalism”. Second, we analyse one example of social engagement that makes 
use of the discourse of anti-instrumentalism – the contemporary Serbian initiative “We 
Won't Let Belgrade D(r)own”. The principal aim of our analysis is to illustrate the ap-
plicability and the heuristic value of the proposed model.  
We start from recognizing the success of neoliberalism, especially in delegitimizing 
the welfare state and mechanisms of democratic decision making, which leaves us with 
the question of the reasons behind this success. We find (one of) the answers in the 
notion of “neoliberal instrumentalism” as a discourse embodying the neoliberal princi-
ple of justification which argues that democratic procedures can legitimately be aban-
doned in the name of the greater efficiency of socio-economic development. We de-
fine “anti-instrumentalist discourse” as an emerging democratic counter-narrative that 
attempts to politicize a certain issue by challenging neoliberal instrumentalism. “Anti-
instrumentalist” discourse should be understood as one, albeit very important, dimen-
sion of a particular instance of democratic social engagement that complements other 
vocabularies of critique.  
We are principally concerned with discourses – of neoliberal instrumentalism and 
reactive anti-instrumentalism, as will be discussed in the next chapters – and ways in 
which they could be put to use in different types of social actions that we name “social 
engagement” (petitions, speeches, intellectual engagement, ad hoc citizens’ protests, 
social movements etc.). Social engagement can be understood as a subtype of a broad-
er concept of value-rational social action – action characterized by the following or 
questioning of norms and rules of conduct – which involves all forms of action directed 
towards social change, but also the attempts at preventing change, i.e. stabilizing exist-
ing societal structures through the legitimation of existing institutional arrangements 
(Vasiljević and Zaharijević, 2017). In this respect, the social engagement perspective 
does not run contrary to similar, yet distinct perspectives favouring notions like social 




movements, protest movements or civic engagement. Rather, it enables us to retain 
the focus on discourses and discursive practices of different actors. Therefore, our case 
study – the Initiative 'We Won't Let Belgrade D(r)own' – has been analysed within this 
broader framework of social engagement. Additionally, one reason that we treat our 
object of analysis – the We Won't Let Belgrade D(r)own Initiative – as a form of social 
engagement is that it 'overflows' the conceptual boundaries between a social move-
ment and a more loosely integrated and porous 'network'.1   
The following chapter brings our detailed understanding of the discourse of neolib-
eral instrumentalism as the principle tool enabling the legitimization and political suc-
cess of different forms of neoliberal ideology. In the third part, we will elaborate the 
conceptual model of anti-instrumentalist discourse, while the fourth section presents 
the case study of the Belgrade initiative.  
 
2. Neoliberal Instrumentalism: Legitimizing the Dismantling of Democracy 
 
Our initial interest in discourses and social engagement challenging and criticizing 
neoliberalism starts from the appreciation of how strikingly successful the legitimizing 
of neoliberalization has been. The success of technocratic austerity politics in the Euro-
pean Union and the continuous dismantling of social rights and welfare institutions are 
unencumbered by democratic control mechanisms. Neoliberalism seems to have man-
aged to delegitimize, not only social democracy and the Keynesian welfare state, but, 
arguably democracy as such (Ferrara, 2014; Merkel and Kneip, 2018), thus opening the 
space for the rise of new authoritarianism. The primary question of our analysis was: 
where does this extraordinary capacity come from? The successful delegitimization of 
Keynesianism and the “bureaucratized” welfare state may be comprehended – and has 
been accounted for by authors such as Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) – in terms of the 
ingenuous synthesis of elements of classical liberalism with the “incorporated” critique 
of Fordism epitomized by the 1968 movement. However, far less theoretical considera-
tion has been given to the apparent success of neoliberalism in delegitimizing democ-
racy in general. An initial answer should be looked for in the domain of the discursive 
 
1  Besides, '[N]ot all networks between likeminded people necessarily reflect social movement 
processes: for example, the international Zapatista support network is not regarded by many analysts as a 
social movement because of the lack of a focused identity and the resulting bonds, even though resources 
of solidarity certainly circulate through it' (Della Porta and Diani, 2006, 22). It is also for this reason that we 
rely on the concept of 'social engagement' rather than 'movement' in our conceptualization of the general 
characteristics of anti-instrumentalist democratic political action and their application to the empirical 
case of the Belgrade initiative. 




power of neoliberalism, in a particular discursive strategy that we term the principle of 
instrumentalism.  Authors such as Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, Norman Fair-
clough and Simon Springer have emphasized the fundamentally “discursive” nature of 
neoliberalism (Springer 2016; Fairclough, 2005; Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001). These 
authors focus on the capability of the neoliberal discourse to “produce” a new social 
reality:  
 “Neoliberalism is a discourse (…) Like all discourses, neoliberalism does not 
simply float above the Earth as a disconnected theory that remains detached from eve-
ryday life. Its policies affect our relationships to each other, its programmes shape our 
behaviours, and its projects implicate themselves in our lived experiences” (Springer, 
2016: 1)  
Assuming an even stronger “constructionist” perspective with respect to the power 
of neoliberal discourse to shape social reality, Bourdieu and Wacquant have defined 
neoliberal discourse as a “double discourse” that naturalizes a certain particularistic 
(neoliberal) worldview by giving it an appearance of “reason” and that “is used as an 
instrument of construction of public and private policies and at the same time to eval-
uate those very policies” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2001: 4).  
As can be observed, analysts of neoliberalism as a discourse have focused for the 
most part on the “naturalization” or “universalization” of the fundamental neoliberal 
values: “the 'efficiency' of the (free) market” and the “celebratory reassertion of (indi-
vidual) 'responsibility'” (ibid: 3), or on the universalization of “neoliberalism's utopian 
goal: [that] all social transactions should be market transactions” (Fairclough, 2005: 
24). These discursive strategies of naturalization could be seen as the means for dele-
gitimizing (and ultimately dismantling) social democracy and the Keynesian welfare 
state in the contemporary West and beyond. In fact, the biggest obstacle to the utopi-
an goal that “all social transactions should be market transactions” is to be found in 
democracy itself: in the (however limited) capacity of the wider social strata in func-
tional democracies to formulate, in Karl Polanyi's famous terms, a “countermovement” 
to marketization through mechanisms of popular sovereignty (Polanyi, 2001).  
The project of neoliberalization finds itself in a paradoxical position. The process of 
neoliberalization needs, on the one hand, to remove democratic procedures and the 
threat of popular sovereignty as obstacles to marketization.  However, the discourse of 
neoliberalism retains, on the other hand, a normative claim to anti-authoritarianism, 
especially in the critique of social democracy. Neoliberalism thus becomes, in Wendy 
Brown's terms, an ideological “Frankenstein”, at once in favour of freedom and its cur-
tailing (Brown, 2018).  




A key neoliberal discursive strategy for overcoming this paradox, we argue, can be 
found in the principle of instrumentalism. This principle symbolically juxtaposes the 
petrified world of democratic proceduralism and the world of economic dynamism, 
supposedly suffocating under such proceduralism. 
The instrumentalist principle within the neoliberal discourse is founded on the sup-
position that democratic institutional arrangements and procedures are too slow and 
time consuming. This is especially emphasized in situations of “crisis” (the post-2008 
constellation), but also more generally, in the sense that these institutional arrange-
ments are the enemies of much-needed “change” and “innovation”. Ultimately, the 
vocabulary of “change” itself is anchored in the “highest value” of economic growth 
which constitutes the telos of the political community within the neoliberal discourse. 
The democratic arrangements are perceived within instrumentalism as being of sec-
ondary importance compared to the goal of creating a dynamic, competitive, efficient 
and sustainable market-based economic system claimed to contribute to “the benefit 
of the citizens” (Matković and Ivković, 2018). In other words, instrumentalism argues 
that the “throughput” of societal reproduction (democratic procedures of decision-
making) stands in the way of optimizing the 'output' of the process – individual wealth, 
economic growth, redistribution, etc. 
 As Matković and Ivković (2018) argue, neoliberal 'instrumentalism' postulates an an-
tithesis of democracy and the effectiveness of social reproduction – the more demo-
cratic a society, the less efficient the process of reproduction. Within neoliberal in-
strumentalism, the notion of the 'reduction of complexity' is a norm, a regulative idea 
and not simply a functional necessity. This imperative of the 'reduction of complexity' 
underpins the neoliberal vision of the good society from education and healthcare, 
where it appears in the form of 'market-rationalization', to the political system. It is 
mobilized against the “overly complex” democratic institutional system in the dis-
course of instrumentalism. Instrumentalism anchors itself both in the normative vo-
cabulary of classical liberalism and in the Romanticist ideal of individual “authenticity”. 
It argues that the “reduction of the complexity” of the democratic political system, pre-
sented in the form of “dismantling bureaucracy”, opens up space for greater individual 
freedom and initiative, as well as for personal self-realization (Boltanski and Chiapello, 
2007: 28-29).  
Also, a rudimentary theory of the human subject complements the ideal of self-
realization in the assumption that the primary sources of human motivation for social 
action are the prospects of maximizing the actors’ material wealth and societal status. 
This leads to the argument that people will lose motivation to work if these prospects 
are systematically constrained by institutional arrangements that aim at maximizing 




the democratic legitimacy of a given political system. The above described discursive 
double logic of de/legitimization can be adequately challenged only with an equally 
complex discursive (counter) strategy. Such a strategy, in a form of criticism that tack-
les both dimensions simultaneously (the normative foundations and explanatory claims 
of neoliberal instrumentalism) is what we term the ‘anti-instrumentalist’ discourse. In 
the following chapter we shall explain in more detail how we conceptualize it, and 
what are its three main narrative formations.  
 
 
3.  Conceptualizing the ‘anti-instrumentalist’ discourse 
 
 Following Matković and Ivković (2018), who introduced a preliminary formulation of 
this concept, we define anti-instrumentalist discourse as a specific type of discourse 
employed by actors of democratic social engagement.2 Anti-instrumentalist discourse 
challenges the neoliberal justification of the reduction of complexity and the abandon-
ing of democratic procedures in the name of the greater efficiency of socio-economic 
development. This is done through the politicization of citizens’ everyday experiences 
of social injustice that are based on the micro level, but effectively serve to draw atten-
tion to the (mis)use of power on the macro level.  
By conceptualization we refer to efforts to develop the general idea of what anti-
instrumentalist discourse is that goes beyond the specificities of various vocabularies of 
critique which different types of social engagement (protests, movements, civic activ-
ism, public intellectual engagement, etc.) use in their activities. We argue that the ap-
plication of anti-instrumentalist discourse as an interpretative framework can be an 
added value to the study of already existing narratives of the critique of neoliberalism, 
like the call for greater inclusiveness of decision-making processes, strengthening of 
democratic institutions, etc.   Our conceptual model of anti-instrumentalist discourse is 
theorized as a response to neoliberal instrumentalism. In developing the model, we  
were guided by the question of which components are indispensable for a  critique of 
instrumentalism's logic of (de)legitimation. The model encompasses three main narra-
tive formations that should feature in a developed form of anti-instrumentalist dis-
course: democratic anti-reductionism, democratic (experimental) proceduralism and 
politicization of everyday experience from micro to macro level. Such conceptual model 
will  then, further in the text, be applied to one contemporary form of democratic so-
 
2  Democratic social engagement is every social engagement for democracy, and as such it should 
be distinguished from those types of social engagement which promote discriminative practices that can 
limit  citizens’ rights and freedoms (extreme rightist, neo-fascist, etc.). 




cial engagement – the We Won't Let Belgrade D(r)own Initiative in Serbia – with the 
aim of examining its heuristic fruitfulness and providing it with an illustrative empirical 
anchoring. The narrative formations are as follows: 
 
3.1. Democratic anti-reductionism  
‘Anti-instrumentalist’ discourse opposes the reduction of the complexity of the 
democratic political system followed by the strengthening of the executive power in 
the name of the greater efficiency of socio-economic development, typically found in 
neoliberal instrumentalism (e.g. Bourdieu, 1998). Contrary to neoliberal reason, anti-
instrumentalist discourse claims that efficiency is, in the long run, a variable strongly 
dependant on the democratic exercise of control over the executive power. In fact, the 
efficiency of socio-economic development has to be observed in the framework of the 
maximization of public welfare instead of the short-term gains of power elites. As 
McCluskey (2003) excellently points out, using the concept of social citizenship to de-
fine citizens’ rights to economic security and general wellbeing: “This fundamental – 
and fundamentally flawed – division between redistribution and efficiency is the linch-
pin that enables neoliberals to turn social citizenship from a public benefit to a public 
threat” (McCluskey, 2003, 787).  
Even if one could claim that the reduction of complexity is not reserved for neoliber-
al instrumentalism only, there is a specificity of neoliberal reduction that is important 
here. We argue that the principle of the reduction of complexity within neoliberal in-
strumentalism always takes the direction of strengthening executive power and limit-
ing the chances of citizens’ participation and deliberation. Anti-instrumentalist dis-
course, on the other side, challenges this approach which confines the ‘steering’ of so-
ciety to a narrow view of the state protagonists or experts. Instead, what is favoured is 
a relational perspective that calls for a non-reductive approach in explaining the overall 
dynamics of problem-solving (and crisis-regulating) tasks in any specific society in gen-
eral. 
This does not mean that reduction of complexity is not desirable and possible. How-
ever, its implementation has to be in the direction of dismantling the legal obstacles to 
the greater participation of citizenry in decision-making processes and revising the in-
dicators of socio-economic development to favour the common welfare. 
 
3.2. Democratic (experimental) proceduralism   
‘Anti-instrumentalist’ discourse opposes the abandoning of democratic procedures 
invoking the decrease of citizens’ participation and deliberation. It advocates for non-
discriminative inclusion of citizens into different (often experimental) arenas that have 




a participatory and deliberative character that does not have to come at the expense of 
procedural complexity. We assume that this narrative could be found in contemporary 
social movements and bottom-up initiatives asking for more consensual maximization 
of public welfare. 
Democratic social engagement with ‘anti-instrumentalist’ discourse can be situated 
within the broader current of contemporary forms of political action that aim at en-
hancing and radicalizing parliamentary liberal democracy. There is a whole spectrum of 
new social movements, deliberative initiatives etc, that focus on the need to further 
democratize democracy through deliberative or other means (Della Porta, 2013; Rossi 
and della Porta, 2009; Della Porta and Rucht, 2013), but may or may not include as-
pects of anti-instrumentalist discourse. 
 ‘Anti-instrumentalist’ discourse argues for keeping the efficient procedural aspect of 
the democratic state functioning, in a similar way as the deliberative approach to de-
mocracy insists on an increase in the number of voices participating in the discussion of 
socio-political issues in order to formulate “better” decisions and policies (Bobbio, 
2010, 2012; Karpowitz and Raphael, 2014; Neblo, 2015). The anti-instrumentalist dis-
course asserts a strong intrinsic connection between the intensification of democracy 
(in particular its deliberative aspects) and the growth of a society’s capacity to solve its 
problems.  
In this regard, coherently with the deliberative approach to democracy, anti-
instrumentalist discourse posits that the appropriate answer to problematic situations 
in democratic societies should be the deepening and strengthening of democratic ele-
ments within the political system (Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012; Floridia, 2013).3 
The opening of space for various non-institutionalized and institutionalized arenas of 
deliberation within the system of parliamentary democracy is directly, not inversely, 
correlated to the growth of a society’s capacity to overcome its problems. Moreover, 
the embeddedness of new spaces for democratic deliberation that could spark a pro-
cess of collective reflection and democratic ‘experimentation’ within the existing insti-
tutional arrangements might allow for the articulation of more effective solutions, 
closer to citizens’ needs, and thus improve the quality of democracy (Geissel and Joas, 
2013).  
 
3  Particularly within the systemic approach, legitimacy is generated through the interaction and mu-
tual dependence between different institutional and non-institutional actors and their (inter)actions. It is 
therefore possible to consider all political practices and discourses that aim to create actions or instances 
that could improve the quality of public discussion (even if only through the inclusion of new perspectives 
or arguments) as an attempt to improve the democratic deliberative quality of the political system (Florid-
ia, 2013). 





3.3. Politicization of everyday experience from micro to macro level   
‘Anti-instrumentalist’ discourse politicizes concrete societal issues, making therefore 
efforts to induce macro social changes starting from micro issues and actions. This dis-
course centres around societal issues close to the ordinary actors’ everyday experience. 
In this regard, the anti-instrumentalist discourse does not only normatively challenge 
certain state policies or courses of action (from the point of view of justness, legality or 
democratic legitimacy) but is deeply enrooted in micro aspects, in the actual problems 
of citizens in their neighbourhoods and their cities. Based in community experience 
and drawing from concrete examples close to everyday life, ‘anti-instrumentalist’ dis-
course assists in shaping the boundaries of the public sphere (Guidry, 2003) pinpointing 
the crucial challenges like effective abuses of power, misuse of commons, corruption 
and malversation of elites on the state or macro level, etc. The social engagement or-
ganized around the Right to the City movements is exemplary for this aspect (Jacob-
sson, 2015; Nicholls, 2008; Jezierska and Polanska, 2017). Such forms of social en-
gagement differ also from those emblematic, traditional (class/labour) movements and 
the so-called new social movements that focus on “cultural and symbolic issues that 
are linked with issues of identity” (Johnston, Laraña, and Gusfield, 1994: 7). The focus 
on this micro-to-macro aspect is what distinguishes anti-instrumentalist discourse from 
the one employed in various democratic experimentations stemming mostly from de-
liberative theories of democracy, like deliberative mini-public (Goodin and Dryzek, 
2006; Fung, 2003; Gastil et al. 2008) which run the risk of remaining isolated from a 
wider political and social system – the scale problem – since their effects could stay 
limited only to the population involved in the specific deliberative democratic practice 
(Parkinson, 2003; Di Mauro and Fiket, 2017). We assume that such tendency is avoided 
in enrooting the ‘anti-instrumentalist’ discourse in local/micro issues while connecting 
them to macro issues.   
 
 
4. Analysis of We won’t let Belgrade D(r)own  
 
This section presents a case study of the We Won't Let Belgrade D(r)own (Ne 
da(vi)mo Beograd) initiative against the Serbian government's urban project Belgrade 
Waterfront (Beograd na vodi). The purpose of the analysis is to see if and how the dis-
course of Ne da(vi)mo Beograd (NDBG) fits into the proposed model, but also to exam-
ine the initiative’s internal deliberative and democratizing capacities.  




The data for this case study were collected through 1) desk analysis of available sec-
ondary data on the Belgrade Waterfront project, 2) official statements and proclama-
tions of the We Won't Let Belgrade D(r)own initiative (some of which can be found on 
their website), 3) semi-structured interviews with four core members of the initiative. 
 
Context, Causes, Purpose  
The Serbian government investment Belgrade Waterfront, together with the alleged 
funds from United Arab Emirates, has been the principal target of the NDBG initiative’s 
actions in the past years. The value of the entire investment was estimated to be $3.1 
billion, with a prospect to reach $4 billion by the final stage (Government of the Repub-
lic of Serbia, 2014). The Belgrade Waterfront project is a project of expensive hotels, 
offices, condominiums, retail and a tall glass tower. It does not comply with the extant 
urban law and planning procedures, which have in the meantime been amended with 
the sole purpose to sustain the project. Generally, it ignores the voices of the relevant 
expert community arguing that the Belgrade Waterfront project does not take into ac-
count the urban and economic reality of Belgrade (Lalović, Radosavljević and Đukanov-
ić, 2015).  In addition, there has been little transparency in the decision making and 
funding of the project. According to the government officials, the legitimation for the 
accelerated implementation of the project at the cost of the neglect of existing laws 
and the critical voices of the expert community lies in the need for fast economic de-
velopment. A clear example of neoliberal instrumentalism at work is a statement from 
the national broadcasting company:  “As the Prime Minister has stated, the Belgrade 
Waterfront Project will result in the growth of the national GDP, the growth in em-
ployment rate and, in ten years’ time, the Serbian capital will have more tourists than 
Budapest” (Radio Television Serbia, website, 13.12.2018).  
In April 2015, The National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted by urgent 
procedure the Law establishing the public interest and special procedures of expropria-
tion and issuance of the construction permit for the realization of the project “Belgrade 
Waterfront” (Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia, 2015, no. 34). Before this step, 
the Government of the Republic of Serbia declared the project Belgrade Waterfront of 
special significance for the Republic of Serbia and the City of Belgrade. In addition, the 
adoption of the Master Plan of Belgrade 2021 was accompanied by a general neglect of 
a variety of objections to the amendments that were submitted by citizens and ex-
perts, particularly the Association of Serbian Architects and the Association of Belgrade 
Architects (Sekretarijat za urbanizam i gradjevinske-poslove, 2015).  
During the same month, the Government of Serbia entered into a contract with the 
company Belgrade Waterfront Capital Investment from Abu Dhabi, owned by the Eagle 




Hills Company (Eagle Hills, 2015). The investor from Abu Dhabi became the owner of 
68% of Belgrade Waterfront, while the Serbian Government owned the remaining 32%. 
Contrary to the initially announced billion figures, Eagle Hills committed to secure 300 
million EUR, out of which 150 million in equity and an additional 150 million as a loan 
from the company founder. At the same time, the Serbian state has committed itself to 
infrastructurally prepare the whole terrain for building.  
Soon after the launching of the project in 2014, the initiative We Won’t Let Belgrade 
D(r)own was founded, bringing together organizations and individuals interested in ur-
ban and cultural policies and urban management of the city. The civil society organisa-
tions that pre-existed the initiative were The Ministry of Space and Who Builds the 
City?. Although their principles drew on general socio-political ideas (social justice and 
wide participation of citizens in the formulation of public policies), their actions were 
aimed at local, municipal levels, against the idea that projects concerning the quality of 
everyday lives of citizens could be implemented exclusively through top-down mecha-
nisms.  
In the beginning, the core members of the Initiative were few, and, although their 
number grew in time, they are still a small group of around 20 people. They have an ac-
tive Facebook page and newsletter they use to spread information about their actions 
and to mobilize people: they have organized eight protests so far, gathering several 
thousand citizens4. They work on voluntary basis and the realization of their actions is 
fully dependant on financial donations by their supporters, fellow citizens.  
 
 
The anti-instumentalism of We Won’t Let Belgrade D(r)own  
 
As stated, the initiative was launched in 2014 as a reaction to the legally dubious 
ways in which the Belgrade Waterfront project had started to be implemented. In the 
self-description of its purpose and aims, the movement states: 
“We are a group of people of various profiles, interests and beliefs, gathered around 
a common goal: putting an end to the degradation and plunder of Belgrade on behalf 
of megalomaniacal urban and architectural projects, primarily the “Belgrade Water-
 
4  At the beginning, the protests they organised were modest in numbers, but the protests started 
to grow after the incident in Hercegovačka street. On the evening of the 25 April 2016 - the day parliamen-
tary elections were held - several masked men came with a bulldozer to clear the place designated for Bel-
grade Waterfront, where some private objects still stood. They tied up the guard and prevented passers-
by to come near, after which they conducted an unauthorized clearance of the terrain. To this day the Ser-
bian public does not know who the perpetrators were and on whose orders they acted. 




front” project. We are determined to fight against the appropriation of parts of our city 
for the private interests of non-transparent actors, for whose expenditures, once again, 
we, the citizens of this country, would have to allocate vast amounts of money. We re-
fuse the constant disregard and contempt for citizens’ voices and opinions in the face of 
the private interests of individuals and shady deals between investors and politicians in 
which, ultimately, the public good and public funds always end up as collateral dam-
age” (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd, 2015). 
From the very beginning, the Initiative’s aim was not only to react to what was seen 
as illegal and harmful to citizens’ interests in general, but also to promote an idea that 
all major urban projects should involve the participation and opinions of all affected 
citizens. In this respect, it is significant to note that when the Initiative had to be regis-
tered as a legal entity – in order to file legal complaints regarding the project – our in-
terviewees stated that the Initiative decided to name their association of citizens The 
right to the city5. This indicates how an ad hoc initiative, formed as a protest against a 
concrete urban and economic project, inscribes itself into a larger notion of how citi-
zens should organize and position themselves as active subjects acting for their inter-
ests.  
As our interlocutors explained, they believe in action on the local scale, as an en-
forcement of “radical democracy on the local level”. Describing why “reclaiming politics 
on the local level” is their principle motivation, our interviewees stressed that the local 
is where most people feel the immediate effects of the national politics; it is also a 
space where they feel they can make a change, describing the national politics as 
heavily affected by global interests where they feel they can do little to effect change.  
In the specific case of Belgrade Waterfront, not only were local citizens excluded 
from any decision-making processes regarding the project, but the local municipalities 
of Savski venac and New Belgrade, which are supposed to host the project itself, were 
left out from the process as well. Lalović and al. supports this in explaining that Bel-
grade Waterfront was placed on a higher level of decision-making, “while the City of 
Belgrade was assigned a facilitating role in providing planning documents and building 
permits” (Lalović et al. 2015, 42). Therefore, further in its statements, the initiative 
elaborates on the lack of citizens’ participation and the need to collectively address the 
public interest, while enforcing democratic procedures instead of cancelling them:  
 
 
5  It is useful to note that many initiatives in the region (following the similar model of the other 
Right to the city movements) use this syntagm as well: the most notable case being the vocal and very ac-
tive group from Zagreb, Croatia, bearing the same name. 




“The project of (proclaimed but never demonstrated) national importance is charac-
terized by non-transparent processes, potentially huge risks, and the evasion and dis-
tortion of legal and legislative mechanisms. Existing documents related to planning are 
expressly deregulated and adopted contrary to the law, in a non-democratic procedure 
in which the participation of citizens is reduced to nothing more than a formality (italic 
added)” (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd, 2015b, 2). “To change this situation we must collective-
ly create a new social architecture that will treat housing as a basic common good (ital-
ic added), and not as basis for enrichment” (Ne da(vi)mo Beograd, 2015b, 11). 
“We have to show that no one must be above the law, that law must not justify the 
plunder of public goods for the profit of few, but needs to enable just and equal distri-
bution of resources and equal chances for decent life (italic added) where we will not be 
afraid that our family or home will be the next in their way of violence demonstration” 
(Ne da(vi)mo Beograd, 2016). 
The principal value that the Initiative stands for is defined through the interview as 
the “struggle for a dignified life” – which in concrete urban struggles gets translated in-
to a right of all citizens to participate in political decisions and to exert control over ur-
ban and living resources.  
The NDBG representatives highlighted several aspects of their strategy, which we 
have analysed in light of our model of anti-instrumentalist discourse. First, they clearly 
emphasize that NDBG identified and publicized the breaking of the procedures in the 
case of the designation of Belgrade Waterfront as a project of national significance. 
However, they keenly believe that bottom-up movements such as theirs need to ques-
tion not only the breach of the procedures, but also the very outcomes of projects. 
They have a deeply rooted belief that political elites are able to find a way to overcome 
procedural obstacles through legal processes of their changing. However, if we add to 
the proceduralist aspect of the initiative's discourse the questions of justification and 
legitimacy, the real interests of the “powerful” and the neglected interests of citizens 
become visible. It is exactly this sidelining of the citizens at the cost of these interests 
that constitutes the core concern of the NDBG efforts. 
The initiative therefore employs a parliamentary democratic criticism of the gov-
ernment’s violation of legal and constitutional procedures, which corresponds to the 
first aspect of our conceptual model – the narrative formation of democratic anti-
reductionism. The Initiative takes a very nuanced approach to the issue of complexity 
reduction – namely, it opposes the form of complexity reduction that neoliberal in-
strumentalism promotes, but it might be prepared to endorse certain simplifications of 
complicated legal mechanisms that in fact obstruct the participation of citizens in 
democratic decision-making processes. One might say, in the spirit of Niklas Luhmann's 




systems theory (Luhmann, 1995), that the Initiative is in certain cases prepared to “re-
duce” certain forms of (democracy-obstructing) complexity precisely in order to “in-
crease” another kind of complexity (democratization of decision-making procedures). 
This complex standpoint of the Initiative is clarified in the interview, as the repre-
sentatives of NDBG explain that their struggle is aimed at increasing the citizens’ partic-
ipation and deliberation, and at advocating for the citizens' right to take part in defin-
ing the common good together. They also insist that the problems concerning the Bel-
grade Waterfront project are complex and cannot be reduced to issues of urban reju-
venation. At the same time, the Initiative opposes the further increasing of the com-
plexity of procedures and administrative obstacles that are frequently used for pre-
venting citizens from participation. “A significant part of democracy’s dysfunctionalities 
emerged from too many procedures” claims one of the interviewees. The initiative it-
self is dedicated to using very inclusive and carefully selected wording in order not to 
alienate any possible ally in its struggle against the governmental monopoly over urban 
common goods. The central argument in the initiative’s discourse that challenges the 
logic of instrumentalism is that an open, inclusive and democratic debate regarding 
problems of the urban development of Belgrade would also bring about an economi-
cally more advantageous project for the citizens (Matković and Ivković, 2018).  
This argument corresponds to the second narrative formation of our conceptual 
model – the narrative formation of democratic experimental proceduralism. As we al-
ready argued, the anti-instrumentalist discourse embraces core deliberative ideals. Our 
interviews showed that the We Won't Let Belgrade D(r)own Initiative aims to be an 
open deliberative arena and to open up to as many (different) citizens as possible. This 
is why the members of the initiative are very attentive regarding the language they use 
when they communicate their messages: the abstract (difficult to comprehend) and 
ideologically charged notions (like neoliberalism, capitalism, socialism) could, according 
to the members of the initiative, alienate many people and hence they prefer to use 
simpler terms, closer to the everyday life of all citizens, such as the notions of the qual-
ity of living, the ripping off of budget money, benefits for the few instead for all, etc. 
Their arguments are justified in terms of common good, but the justification they use is 
also very inclusive in its nature as it tends to be acceptable and comprehensible to 
“all”. 
Another very relevant dimension of the initiative's inclusiveness is that it considers 
as indispensable the networking and cooperation with other citizens’ movements and 
organisations. In this regard, the initiative began cooperating with various workers’ un-
ions (the Belgrade Police Union, for example) and to form, with other municipal initia-
tives, “ad hoc alliances” that usually revolve around specific emerging issues. It is worth 




remarking that the nature of alliances is far from being openly political, or based on 
any clear ideological platform, tending to promote non-exclusive values and the use of 
inclusive argumentation.  
The Initiative’s struggles for (deliberative) democracy are also backed by internal ef-
forts to self-organise in deliberative and participatory ways. In principle, the members 
rely on inclusionary and egalitarian values, though they admit they are struggling with 
finding the right way of coordinating the work of a growing group of those interested 
to be a part of the Initiative. They want to build an inclusive platform, but they are still 
trying to find orientation under the sudden spotlight they found themselves under in 
recent months. Their internal organization is not hierarchical, although they admit that 
the most active and long-term members make an “inner circle” which is a loose deci-
sion-making body. They want to bridge the gap between the inner and outer circles as 
the key decisions are still taken through consultations and careful deliberation of the 
members of the inner circle (around 20 persons). In order to avoid a hierarchical struc-
ture of decision-making, their intention for the near future is to form parallel operative 
groups – dedicated to the work on specific themes – from which delegates would be 
chosen to act as members of the core group. The interviewed members see this delib-
erative democratic reorganization of the initiative as their main challenge and neces-
sary requirement of the democratic initiatives and movements. Therefore, we could 
argue that they are in the midst of the process of restructuring with an aim of estab-
lishing an inclusive and egalitarian platform, and that one of their main aims is to fur-
ther develop already existing internal deliberative capacities.  
Finally, in relying on the insight that people care more about their immediate sur-
roundings – and that local concerns are greater mobilizing factors than global political 
affairs – the Initiative endorses the third component of our conceptual model – the po-
liticization of everyday experience from micro- to macro-level – as it posits itself primar-
ily as an actor concerned about concrete urban problems, but with a clear set of guid-
ing political values. Focusing on a particular project aimed at the urban rejuvenation of 
one part of Belgrade, the Initiative is raising far more complex issues, connecting the 





Even though they bring interesting and sometimes fruitful experimentation into the 
democratic decision-making processes, top-down designed deliberative mini-publics 
are still far from being able to offer solutions to a deepening societal crisis in neoliberal 




democracies. This is why we have to turn to the engagements from below and to re-
think their contribution to the democratization theory, not as a contingent and tempo-
rary issue, but as a potentially crucial tool for achieving the true democratization of 
democracies. 
Anti-instrumentalist discourse, as we argued, challenges neoliberal instrumentalism 
from the positions of democratic inclusiveness, deliberative practices and local rooted-
ness. Our analysis of the “We Won't Let Belgrade Drown” initiative identified the three 
components of anti-instrumentalist discourse – the narrative formations of democratic 
anti-reductionism, democratic experimentalist proceduralism and the politicization of 
everyday experiences from micro to macro level – in the language that the Initiative re-
lies on for defining itself and mobilizing the citizens against the “Belgrade Waterfront” 
project, which the Serbian government justifies on the basis of neoliberal instrumental-
ism.  
The Belgrade initiative managed to politicize the “Belgrade Waterfront” project, 
which had been discursively constructed as non-political by the Serbian government, 
due to its orientation and emphasis on concrete societal phenomena that exert imme-
diate effects on citizens. This supports our argument that anti-instrumentalist dis-
course could potentially be more effective in challenging the project of neoliberal re-
structuring than the electoral campaigns of political parties and movements that at-
tempt to mount “comprehensive” critiques of this project. Especially, it is relevant in 
the context of the contemporary decrease of electoral participation, which points to 
citizens’ saturation with the existing system of parliamentary democracy. In such a sit-
uation, democratic critique coming from bottom-up social engagement is essential for 
advancing democracy and providing a more consensual maximization of public welfare.  
The relative success of the NDBG initiative (massive protests, rising financial and in-
frastructural support from individual citizens) seems to confirm this, although, of 
course, the Initiative’s long-term effects on political and wider social processes are yet 
to be seen. This limited case study was chosen primarily to present a type of democrat-
ic social engagement that relies on the discourse of anti-instrumentalism, rooted in the 
local community but addressing ideas and values of a wider social and political im-
portance, struggling against the instrumentalist arguments usurping public goods.  
However, we would like to underline that the proposed conceptual model, given 
that it is still in its inception phase, needs to be further elaborated. One of the ways in 
which we would especially like to advance our ideas about concrete forms of social en-
gagement is through transcending oppositionary and defensive modes of thinking (il-
lustrated in prefixes like anti-) with the aim of adopting and implementing more con-
crete and elaborated visions of the desired political and social order. On the empirical 




plane, we still lack a thorough analysis of the broad spectrum of protests we are wit-
nessing today, triggered by the multiple effects of the 2008 economic crisis. Numerous 
challenges arise from this field: the interplay between global and local contexts, social 
composition of the actors, the role of social media, the rise of new discourses, etc. De-
fining the right research questions and conducting comparative research, which will 
feed into an interdisciplinary reflection on a proposed theoretical framework, are nec-
essary future steps to deepen the inquiry into the new forms of democratic social en-
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